Self-Protection for Emerging Market Economies by Martin Feldstein
*Professor of Economics, Harvard University, and President of the National Bureau of
Economic Research.
-1- SelfProt.122198
Self-Protection for Emerging Market Economies
Martin Feldstein
*
International economic crises will continue to occur in the future as they have for centuries
past.  The rapid spread of the 1997 crisis in Asia and of the 1982 crisis in Latin America showed how
shifts in market perceptions can suddenly bring trouble to countries even when there has been no
change in objective conditions. More recently, the sharp jump in emerging market interest rates after
Russia’s August 1998 default underlined the vulnerability of all emerging market economies to
increases in investors’ aversion to risk.
Emerging market countries that want to avoid the devastating effects of such crises must
protect themselves.  They cannot depend on the International Monetary Fund or other international
organizations nor expect that a “new global financial architecture” will make the world economy less
dangerous. Taking steps to protect themselves requires more than avoiding those bad policies that
make a currency crisis inevitable. The process of contagion makes even the virtuous vulnerable to
currency runs. 
Liquidity is the key to self-protection.  A country that has substantial international liquidity --
large foreign exchange reserves and a ready source of  foreign currency loans -- is less likely to be
the object of a currency attack.  Substantial liquidity also permits a country that is attacked from
within or without to defend itself better and to make more orderly adjustments.  The challenge is to
find ways to increase liquidity at reasonable cost.-2- SelfProt.122198
The need for enhanced liquidity reflects the inevitable absence of an international  lender of
last resort.  Within any national economy the central bank is the ultimate source of liquidity to the
banking system and therefore to the economy. A solvent commercial bank (i.e., one with  assets that
exceed its liabilities when both are evaluated at fair market value) may not have enough liquid assets
to pay depositors if many of them demand their funds at once. To prevent or contain a run of
depositors, central banks follow the advice provided more than a century ago by Walter Bagehot: a
central bank, as the lender of last resort in a financial crisis,  must lend “freely, at penalty interest
rates, on appropriate collateral.”
There is no equivalent international lender of last resort that provides foreign exchange to
countries that are temporarily illiquid but ultimately solvent in the sense that they could repay such
loans with export earnings. Although the International Monetary Fund has organized large packages
of credits for crisis countries, it does not “lend freely” at a time of need but disburses its funds
gradually as the crisis countries meet a series of detailed conditions. Because the IMF’s conditions
are onerous and complex, private creditors cannot know whether funds will actually be available. The
IMF loan packages are therefore not available to provide confidence to the financial markets that the
country will have enough  foreign exchange reserves to defend itself against speculators and others
who would sell the currency.     
There is a fundamental difference between the IMF and  national central banks that
prevents the IMF from ever acting as a lender of last resort.  A national central bank can create as
much of the domestic currency as its banking system wants.  In contrast, the ability of the IMF to
provide dollars or other hard currencies is constrained by the limited size of its capital. -3- SelfProt.122198
The plan for an new “enhanced” IMF lending facility announced by the G-7 countries in
October 1998 would in principle provide funds quickly to countries before a crisis occurs.  However,
the proposal provides that funds would only be available to “pre-approved” countries that are deemed
to be “pursuing strong IMF-approved policies.” None of the Asian countries that experienced crises
in 1997 would have been able to meet this test. The loan to Brazil announced in November 1998 was
not part of this new arrangement (which had not yet been adopted by the IMF) and was made at a
time when the Brazilian government had not passed the key legislation required to achieve reduced
fiscal and trade deficits. Although it was described as an attempt to lend before a crisis began, these
funds were also scheduled to be paid only gradually as Brazil met a variety of stringent conditions on
budget policy. 
It is not at all clear how the proposed pre-approval plan would work in practice.  In the end,
the IMF might simply try to use it to impose the same kinds of inappropriately intrusive economic
restructuring on countries as it did in its post-crisis plans in Asia (see my “Refocusing the IMF,”
Foreign Affairs, March-April 1998.) If so, few countries might be willing to participate. 
More generally, the new G-7 proposal is fundamentally misconceived because it focuses on
countries that are in what might be called the “immediate pre-crisis stage” instead of recognizing that
most emerging market countries need increased liquidity to reduce their risk of crisis and to manage
crises when they occur. Even with the recently increased IMF capital provided by the United States
and other members, the IMF does not have enough funds to finance a substantial number of such
contingent loans. Nor is there any plan to assure the “appropriate private sector involvement” (i.e.,
to induce banks and bondholders to roll over existing private credits) that the G-7 plan assumes.
Using national governments to force private creditors to continue lending to a country experiencing-4- SelfProt.122198
a currency crisis would decrease the “moral hazard” of excessive lending in good times  but only at
the cost of substantially reducing the long-term availability of funds to emerging market economies.
This article shows the role of liquidity in the origin and management of currency crises.  I
discuss two possible ways to increase liquidity: a low cost increase in foreign exchange reserves based
on a strategy of investing reserves in a broader range of assets,  and a new voluntary national credit
facility collateralized with export earnings. 
Fluctuating Exchange Rates
Although sharp swings in currency values can have a powerful destructive force on national
economies, the normal fluctuations of exchange rates make a positive contribution to economic well-
being by guiding capital to better uses around the world.  If Mexican business investment becomes
more profitable, Mexican interest rates rise and Mexican stocks  become more attractive.  Foreign
portfolio investors buy pesos to invest in Mexican stocks and bonds while foreign companies buy
pesos to acquire or build new businesses in Mexico. The rising peso reduces Mexico’s exports and
increases its imports, providing the extra flow of capital and of  real resources to invest in local
businesses. When Mexican investment becomes less profitable, investors sell the peso and direct
capital to other countries where it can be used more productively.  
In guiding the global flow of capital, currencies function like stocks, bonds and other financial
assets.  Banks, pension funds and other  financial investors choose investments in different currencies
on the basis of the expected yield and associated risk. Investors buy a currency they expect will rise
in value and sell one they expect to fall. A higher interest rate attracts funds to a currency unless its
value is expected to fall enough to outweigh the interest rate advantage. -5- SelfProt.122198
Importantly,  it’s not necessary to own a currency in order to sell it.  Foreign investors who
think the peso will fall relative to the dollar can borrow pesos, sell them for dollars and invest the
dollars, expecting that after the peso’s fall they will sell their dollar asset and repay the peso debt with
depreciated pesos. That means that a currency’s value can be driven down not only when it is sold
by domestic residents or by foreign investors who initially held the currency but even by an
international investor who borrows the currency in order to take advantage of his anticipation that
it will decline in value. 
Because expectations drive exchange rates, the fluctuations in currency values can be large
and rapid. The Asian experience shows the serious damage that a sharp currency decline can cause.
The most substantial immediate effect of a sharp fall in a currency is to increase the value of debts
denominated in foreign currencies.  When the Thai baht fell from 25 baht per dollar in June 1997 to
more than 50 baht per dollar in January 1998, the number of baht that a Thai company needed to
repay its dollar denominated debt more than doubled.  In addition, a  falling currency raises the price
of imports and gives domestic producers the ability to increase prices as well. This causes higher
inflation unless the government raises interest rates, depressing domestic production and employment
still further.  The problem becomes more acute as the size of the tradable sector grows, a particularly
important issue for many smaller economies with large flows of exports and imports.
To prevent these inflationary pressures and the increases in the value of foreign debts, many
governments use foreign exchange reserves and monetary policy to try to avoid what they see as
irrational and unfounded shifts in currency values or to try to slow any process of adjustment.  If
private investors want to sell the currency, the government may use its dollar reserves to buy the
currency or raise interest rates to induce investors to hold the currency.-6- SelfProt.122198
Exchange rate policy is complicated by the fact that many governments also control  the
exchange rate as a form of self-discipline to achieve a non-inflationary monetary policy. Since a lax
monetary policy that causes inflation also causes the value of the national currency to decline, a
government that commits itself to a fixed exchange rate relative to the dollar is implicitly committing
itself to the same low inflation rate as that in the United States. If its commitment to a fixed exchange
rate is believed by domestic business and labor, they will be less likely to try to raise prices and wages.
Although low inflation could in principle be achieved without such an external anchor, governments
have often found that this is a useful way of reducing inflation and keeping it down. Unfortunately,
despite this virtuous intent, policies of fixed exchange rates are often a prelude to a currency crisis.
Four Types of Crises
Current Account Crises 
An exchange rate that is fixed at a level that causes an increasing trade deficit inevitably leads
to an attack on the currency, a loss of foreign exchange reserves,  and a corrective fall in the exchange
rate. The currency may be at a level that causes a trade deficit because it was initially set too high,
or because domestic inflation made its prices internationally uncompetitive at that exchange rate, or
because of currency devaluations in competing countries. 
Thailand “fixed” its exchange rate at 25 baht to the dollar in 1987 and promised to use
whatever policies were needed  to keep it there. By the mid-1990s the baht was grossly overvalued,
leading to a current account deficit (the combination of the trade deficit and the net interest due on
foreign debts) equal to 8 percent of Thailand’s GDP, one of the highest anywhere in the world. 
Any current account deficit must be financed with an equally large inflow of funds from the
rest of the world.  Because of the Thai government’s promise that the baht-dollar exchange rate-7- SelfProt.122198
would remain fixed, Thai banks and non-financial businesses felt comfortable about borrowing dollars
at low interest rates to finance activities in Thailand. Similarly, foreign creditors were willing to lend
in order to get the slightly higher rate of interest available in Thailand. 
The banks and the foreign lenders both recognized that there was some risk in what they were
doing.  The unprecedentedly large current account deficit could be sustained only as long as foreign
investors and lenders were prepared to keep sending money to Thailand, increasing their total Thai
exposure. If the day came when they were no longer willing to do so, the current account would have
to shrink to the amount that could be financed with the available capital inflow.  Shrinking the current
account deficit would require a lower value of the baht to make Thai exports more attractive and to
reduce imports.  The fall in the baht would hurt Thai banks and businesses that had borrowed dollars.
Foreigners who lent baht would also be losers when the currency fell and those who lent dollars
would be at risk that the Thai banks and businesses to which they had lent would be unable to repay
their dollar obligations. 
Thailand’s massive current account deficit and the foreign lending to Thailand that financed
that deficit lasted a surprisingly long time.  But eventually fear outweighed greed and foreigners were
no longer willing to keep lending. As the baht began to fall, nervous investors with baht assets who
had no idea how far it might decline sold baht. Others borrowed baht in order to sell it on the
presumption that the baht would continue to decline. The government tried to maintain the value of
the baht but eventually exhausted its foreign reserves in the process and was unable to do so. Before
the baht stopped falling, its value had declined by more than half, from 25 baht to the dollar to more
than 50 baht to the dollar.-8- SelfProt.122198
Thailand could have avoided the loss of its reserves and probably had a smaller and less
painful adjustment if it had abandoned the fixed exchange rate earlier and allowed the baht to find a
level in the market. By the end of 1998, the market panic had subsided and the baht had settled to 36
baht per dollar. But although it is easy to criticize Thailand in retrospect, countries like Thailand delay
abandoning the fixed rate or devaluing its level because doing so inevitably brings  inflation, higher
interest rates, and increased foreign debt burdens.  In contrast,  there was always the hope that the
overvaluation might correct itself without a change in the nominal exchange rate if domestic prices
fell or the dollar (to which the baht was tied) declined in value relative to other global currencies.
(Such strategies are sometimes successful. Argentina rejected the criticisms of its fixed “overvalued”
dollar-peso exchange rate and was able to remain competitive because its domestic producers lowered
the cost of Argentine products by increasing productivity.) 
An overvalued currency and the associated capital inflow are also helpful as long as they last,
keeping import prices down and export prices up while providing a capital inflow to finance profitable
domestic investments.  After more than a decade of current account deficits, Thailand had hoped that
it would be able to go on financing those deficits and therefore  to continue adding more to its
productive capital than it could finance with domestic savings alone. 
The specific facts in Thailand’s case may have made a currency devaluation inevitable,
especially after the decline of the Japanese yen  and the weakness of the  Japanese economy caused
Japanese imports from Thailand to decline. But the situation is never completely certain and a country
that has enough international liquidity – large foreign exchange reserves and access to additional
credits denominated in dollars or yen – can try to sustain the high value of its currency. -9- SelfProt.122198
With sufficient liquidity, a country can challenge the speculators and others who sell the
currency, buying the currency to maintain its value or even driving the currency’s  value temporarily
higher to “punish” those who bet against it. Speculation against a currency is also expensive because
the interest rate on the currency being sold is generally substantially higher than the rate on the dollar
or yen.  Speculators who have much to lose through a possible rise in the currency value and the extra
interest that they pay will therefore be attracted to bet only against the currencies that look
particularly vulnerable.  Large reserves and access to substantial additional foreign loans can reduce
that vulnerability and increase confidence in the currency, thereby reducing the likelihood of an
attempt to profit from a decline in the currency’s value. But doing so requires reserves that are much
larger than most emerging market countries have traditionally held.
The decision of when to use reserves in this way and when to accept a devaluation is not a
purely economic issue with a technically correct solution that can be provided by the IMF or other
advisers but involves a balancing of risks that is the essential responsibility of a sovereign government.
Balance Sheet Crises
A country may have a market-determined “floating” exchange rate and a current account
surplus but still come under attack because its short-term private and government liabilities
denominated in foreign currencies exceed its foreign exchange reserves.  Such a country may be
solvent in the sense that it can service its foreign currency debts with its future export earnings but
is temporarily illiquid because it does not have the funds with which to meet its immediate obligations.
If foreign creditors have confidence in the country and its currency, they will continue to roll over the
short-term debts or extend their maturity. But if enough foreign creditors worry that the country will-10- SelfProt.122198
not be able to meet its obligations because other foreign creditors will not continue to lend, the
country will be forced to default or to reschedule its loans and to devalue its currency in order to
increase export earnings to repay its debts more quickly. 
Korea’s experience in 1997 is a good example of a balance sheet crisis. After Korea
deregulated part of its banking system in the early 1990s, a group of small investment banks used
their new freedom to borrow foreign currencies with short maturities and invested those funds in
Korean won assets and in high risk foreign securities like Russian bonds.  By late 1997, the value of
the foreign obligations due within 12 months exceeded Korea’s official foreign currency reserves.
International investors, nervous after the collapse of the Thai baht and other Asian currencies in the
previous few months, focused on Korea’s  balance sheet mismatch of assets and liabilities and began
to sell the Korean won.
Korea could have stopped the inappropriate foreign borrowing and, with Korea’s strong
export performance, could have earned enough foreign currency to repay the existing foreign
obligations. But it could not do so quickly enough if the foreign creditors all demanded payment and
refused to roll-over existing obligations. In short, Korea was solvent but illiquid, i.e., able to meet its
obligations given enough time but unable to do so immediately. 
Had Korea not allowed its liquidity to deteriorate in this way, there need not have been any
crisis in Korea.  But global financial investors saw that Korea did not have adequate liquidity and that
a won devaluation was likely to occur. Financial investors converted  the won that they already
owned or borrowed won and then sold those funds for dollars. Before the end of the year, the Korean
currency had collapsed and the Korean government was in the hands of the IMF.
Bank-Run Currency Crises-11- SelfProt.122198
 A common feature of the Asian currency crises has been the widespread failure of  domestic
banks. Many of these failures were the result of the currency decline which raised the value of the
banks’ dollar liabilities relative to its domestic currency assets.  The currency decline also hurt banks
with dollar denominated loans (as in Thailand) because the corporate borrowers had dollar liabilities
and local currency income.  But even before the currency decline, the banks failed because they had
accumulated so many bad loans and other investments that their liabilities to depositors exceeded the
true value of their loans and other assets.
Banks can retain deposits only as long as depositors remain confident that they can withdraw
their funds on demand. When depositors get nervous that a bank run will leave the bank without the
ability to meet further withdrawal requirements, the fear of a bank run becomes self-fulfilling. 
Depositors may also fear that the national central bank will act as a lender of last resort to
banks that are temporarily illiquid but will not help insolvent banks (where liabilities exceed the true
value of assets.) Because depositors do not know the true condition of individual banks, the safest
thing for depositors who fear bank insolvency to do is to withdraw funds from all domestic banks and
seek a safe haven by depositing those funds abroad.  If enough depositors want to do this, there will
be a serious run on the currency that reduces its value. If the government tries to resist, it will deplete
its foreign reserves and increase the risk of an exchange rate collapse. (A run on domestic banks need
not cause a currency run if depositors can shift their funds to local banks that are owned abroad and
therefore backed by strong overseas banks and by their central banks.)
The obvious and widely proffered advice for avoiding such runs is that emerging economy
governments should not direct commercial banks to favor particular industries or firms and should
improve the quality of their banking supervision so that widespread insolvencies do not occur. The-12- SelfProt.122198
former runs contrary to many national development strategies while the latter is hard to implement
in practice, as the experience in the United States, Japan and many European countries has repeatedly
shown. Insolvencies and banking crises will therefore occur. 
Sufficient international liquidity in the form of either foreign currency reserves or access to
foreign credit might  allow a government to restructure and recapitalize its banks without
experiencing such a currency crisis. The more international liquidity a government has, the less
depositors will feel that they must rush to convert their currency before the reserves are depleted. And
preventing a currency decline can be the best way to protect the banks’ solvency.
Contagion Crises and Irrational Speculation
Finally, there can be currency declines that are not due to current account imbalances, to
balance sheet mismatches, or to banking system failures. Even a  currency that is allowed to float
freely can be subject to a sharp drop, just as the value of individual stocks on the New York Stock
Exchange can swing substantially in response to new information or to shifts in market psychology.
Currencies that do not need to decline in order to shrink a current account deficit or to correct a
balance sheet mismatch may nevertheless be pushed down by contagion based on geography, trade
patterns, investors’ portfolio strategies, and other conditions. Such currency declines can trigger
rising inflation, or an economic downturn based on the increased debt burden, or both. A country
with sufficient liquid international assets or credit availability can intervene in the currency market to
defend its currency from unjustified pressures.  The very presence of that liquidity is likely to promote
the confidence among market participants the reduces the likelihood of irrational speculation. The
traditional alternative, defending the currency by raising interest rates is often ineffective in itself while-13- SelfProt.122198
depressing the domestic economy and, by reducing the value of the local stock market, may actually
exacerbate the capital outflow.
Increasing International Liquidity
An emerging economy can increase its net liquidity by reducing short-term foreign liabilities,
by accumulating liquid reserves, and by organizing a collateralized credit facility. Each of these has
its cost, which is why countries are tempted to do nothing and to take the risk of a currency crisis.
But the Asian experience shows that the very large costs of a currency crisis may significantly exceed
the costs of maintaining enough liquidity to achieve a substantial reduction in the risk of crisis.
The three ways of increasing liquidity are mutually reinforcing.  Doing some of each reduces
the cost of doing the others.  A cost-effective  strategy therefore probably involves doing some of all
three.  A major challenge is to develop new ways to reduce the costs of doing so.
Avoiding Excessive Short-Term Foreign Debt
Banks, companies and governments in emerging market countries borrow with short-
maturities in dollars or yen because such loans have lower interest rates than longer-term or domestic
currency loans. But such funds are particularly risky because foreign lenders may refuse to renew
lending if conditions in the borrowing country appear to change or if lenders become more risk averse
in general (as they did after the August 1998 Russian default.) Just the accumulation of too much
such debt relative to reserves may trigger a currency crisis, as Korea learned at the end of 1997. And
if a currency decline occurs, the increased local value of the dollar denominated debt can cause
corporate  bankruptcies and a decline of economic activity. 
Chile successfully discouraged such short-term capital inflows by requiring borrowers to
deposit 20 percent of foreign loans with the government for six months without interest, a very-14- SelfProt.122198
substantial penalty for short-term borrowing but not for long-term capital inflows. Several studies
have shown that the total capital inflow to Chile was not reduced by this policy but that the
composition of funds was shifted to less volatile forms. 
Although substituting longer-term debt and equity funds for short-term borrowing raises the
cost of capital to Chile’s private borrowers, it was a successful way of reducing the risk of a currency
crisis. The Chileans have also shown that this incentive mechanism can be varied in response to
changing conditions. It is certainly a technique that more countries will be thinking about in
conjunction with the increased monitoring of their country’s overall foreign asset and liability
positions. 
Short-term foreign debt is of course not the only source of risk.  In countries without capital
controls, which includes most of the ASEAN countries and the countries of Latin America, local
residents have the right to convert any amount of their cash or bank deposits from the local currency
to foreign currencies. Unless limited by the government, the amount of such convertible deposits can
be increased rapidly by bank lending. Limiting short term debts to less than foreign exchange reserves
is not enough to achieve the desired level of international liquidity.  Although the unwillingness of
foreign creditors to roll over existing loans may be the most  probable danger, the magnitude of
widespread capital flight by domestic residents and of speculation by foreigners who borrow and sell
the domestic currency may be the greater risk. 
Accumulating Foreign Exchange Reserves
The most direct way for a country to achieve liquidity is to accumulate large amounts of liquid
foreign reserves. China’s reserves of more than $140 billion send a strong signal to international
investors and domestic residents that China will not be forced to devalue the yuan.  But many-15- SelfProt.122198
countries with floating exchange rates, which in principle would have no need for reserves if they
actually intend to let the value of their currency be determined exclusively by market forces,  have
substantial reserves to reduce the risk of rapid and substantial currency declines. 
Reserves are costly in two ways. First, accumulating the reserves through trade surpluses
requires the country to export more than it imports, implying less domestic consumption and
investment than would otherwise prevail.  Second, when the government buys foreign currency from
its exporters and issues domestic bonds in exchange, the government pays a much higher rate of
interest on its domestic bonds than it receives on reserves which in practice are  invested in low
yielding U.S. Treasury bills. 
Accumulating reserves by running a trade surplus is also at best a slow process. In addition,
keeping the export earnings as reserves rather than investing them in domestic infrastructure or
making the funds available for private business investments  involves sacrificing a substantial real rate
of return for the nation. 
Reserves can be accumulated more quickly and without reducing real domestic investment
by borrowing abroad with medium or long-term maturities and then investing those funds in liquid
easily-marketed securities, essentially the strategy that China, with $160 billion of total foreign
liabilities, has implicitly adopted. But this strategy can also be quite expensive. Mexico, for example
would now pay an 11 percent interest rate on a twenty year bond,  six percentage points more than
it would earn on an investment in US Treasury bills. Thirty billion dollars of additional reserves,
enough to double its current reserves,  would therefore cost Mexico two billion dollars a year. 
Although this price may seem high ($2 billion is nearly 0.5 percent of Mexico’s GDP), it must
be compared to the value of reducing the likelihood of another currency crisis. Moreover, the $2-16- SelfProt.122198
billion price tag may overstate the true national cost of such reserves because having the reserves may
lower the cost of other  Mexican private debt and equity capital. It is noteworthy that China, with
very large reserves,  pays interest of only about 7 percent on its long-term bonds. 
A country could substantially lower the net cost of holding reserves  by investing them in
liquid assets with higher yields than Treasury bills. US corporate stocks had a real yield of 7 percent
in the half century through 1995, more than 6 percentage points higher than the real  yield on
Treasury bills over the same period.  Although corporate stocks are riskier than Treasury bills, a
country could lower its overall risk by having larger foreign exchange reserves invested partly in
stocks than smaller reserves invested solely in Treasury bills.  
Many governments still judge the adequacy of their reserves in relation to the value of
imports. But a reserve goal of “six months of imports” ignores the fact that currency crises are about
capital flows, not trade financing.  What matters is the value of reserves relative to the amount of the
currency that speculators might sell when the country’s fundamental economic conditions do not
warrant a currency decline.
Creating a Collateralized Credit Facility
A country’s ability to borrow large sums of foreign exchange on short notice is virtually as
useful as holding an equal amount of reserves. The G-7 was right to emphasize the desirability of a
pre-crisis loan fund but wrong to expect the IMF and the G-7 governments to provide the loans. The
IMF has less than $200 billion of total lending capacity, not a large number in comparison to the 1998
package of $42 billion for Brazil alone.  The Japanese government’s plan to help Asian governments
by guaranteeing their debts involved only $15 billion of Japanese funds. In contrast the American-17- SelfProt.122198
banks alone have more than $5,000 billion in outstanding loans and investments. The real challenge
is to utilize private lines of credit from banks and other investors in industrial countries. 
The G-7 called for continued lending to emerging market borrowers by the private creditors
during times of economic stress. It is hard, however, to imagine why banks and bond holders would
not try to reduce their exposure under those circumstances, even if international organizations and
private rating agencies make reassuring statements. The only reliable way to maintain private lending
and increase the volume of credit as a substitute for additional foreign reserves is to create a
collateralized credit facility, an explicit agreement that provides collateral to protect the banks and
other providers of credit. Although there is no substitute for sound economic behavior, creditors
value good collateral more than the appearance of virtue.  And with collateral there is no need to
argue about whether a country is unable to meet its debt service requirements or is just unwilling to
do so.
Done properly, such a facility could substitute for an international  lender of last resort,
lending freely at penalty interest rates against good collateral. The problem of course is to identify
collateral that banks and bond holders could rely on in the case of default.  Such collateral cannot be
real estate or other domestic assets in the emerging market country which would be difficult for
creditors to take and equally difficult to convert into dollars or other hard currencies.
The most suitable collateral would be trade receivables, i.e., the export earnings in hard
currencies of the domestic firms.  Such collateral is now common in many private credit arrangements
between firms in emerging economies and their industrial country creditors. A collateralized facility
was also used by the United States and Mexico in 1983 and again in 1995, with a dollar loan secured
by the receipts from the Mexican government’s future oil sales. (Argentina now has an essentially-18- SelfProt.122198
uncollateralized  $7 billion line of credit from the foreign banks that operate in Argentina but is having
difficulty maintaining this uncollateralized arrangement as banks become more risk averse.) 
A collateralized credit facility would be a voluntary arrangement between an emerging market
government and a group of foreign banks and other financial institutions. Participation by the IMF
or the World Bank on the same terms as the private lenders would create much greater confidence
in these credits since countries are very reluctant to default on payments to the IMF and the World
Bank. The participants would decide the maximum amount of foreign exchange credit that would
be available on request and would agree in advance on the interest rate (or spread) that would be paid
if the loan facility were actually exercised. The government would have the option to borrow these
funds at any time during a period with a terminal date that is automatically maintained at two years
into the future, subject to any of the parties being able to withdraw on two years’ notice. The
government would pay a fee to each of the potential lenders for this option to obtain credit under less
favorable future circumstances. Each of the potential lenders might participate on equal terms or a
more elaborate structure might be devised with some creditors taking more risk (e.g., being the last
to be repaid) in exchange for higher fees and interest. 
If it becomes necessary to use the  loan facility, the borrowing government would require that
all of the earnings of its exporters (or of exporters above some minimum size) be repatriated
immediately and paid to a trustee institution like the Bank of England or the New York Federal
Reserve.  The trustee would transfer a fraction of these receipts to the creditors to service the newly
incurred debt, with the specific fraction depending on the amount of debt incurred.  The remainder
of the export receipts would be transferred to the emerging market government which would pay the-19- SelfProt.122198
exporters the value of their exports in a combination of the local currency and the currency of the
export earnings. 
To make this operational on short notice, the country must have enacted legislation well in
advance to establish the diversion of export earnings if it uses the credit facility. Currency controls
would also be needed during the period of the loan, permitting only importers and others with specific
needs to convert domestic funds into foreign exchange. The enforcement of the diversion would be
easier if the G-7 countries required importers in their own countries to divert payments for imports
to the trustee. 
A collateralized credit facility can be much less expensive than accumulating and holding
foreign exchange reserves as long as it is not actually utilized.  If it is used, the exchange controls and
the payment diversions would involve large administrative costs. Actions to evade these controls
would waste resources.  A country’s decision to create a collateralized  facility must reflect its
judgement about whether the size of the potential credit could be large enough to deter irrational
speculation and crises of contagion and to give the country sufficient adjustment time to deal with
crises that do occur. 
Alternatives to Liquidity
I have emphasized self-protection through increased liquidity because I believe that the other
ideas that have been proposed are not suitable. I have already commented on the inadequacy of the
past IMF programs and of the proposed new “enhanced lending facility”. Three other ideas that are
frequently discussed deserve brief comment.
Economic Isolation.-20- SelfProt.122198
Prime Minister Mahathir has chosen to impose complete controls for the indefinite future on
all capital inflows and outflows of Malaysia.  This not only denies Malaysia the ability to supplement
domestic savings with foreign capital but is likely to discourage firms from making direct investments
in fear that controls will later prevent repatriation of profits. Efforts to evade controls will lead to
waste and corruption.
The argument that such isolation is desirable because it allows Malaysia to stimulate its
economy by lower interest rates is unconvincing since the same stimulus could be achieved with
targeted tax incentives that offset the effect of high interest rates.
A Currency Board
Argentina and Hong Kong operate modified versions of the textbook currency board system.
In a pure currency board system, Argentina would hold one US dollar (or an equivalent amount of
some other ‘hard’  currency) for every peso that is distributed as cash or as reserves in the
commercial banks. Everyone would have the right to exchange pesos for dollars at that exchange rate.
A currency board system, if strictly enforced, would prevent a successful run on the Argentinean peso
because withdrawing foreign exchange reserves would force the central bank to reduce the money
supply, thereby raising interest rates.  The government is never forced to devalue because interest
rates keep rising as the country loses reserves until interest rates are high enough to induce investors
to stop selling pesos.  In principle, this self-regulating mechanism discourages speculators so the
interest rates need never rise to high levels. 
The success of the currency board as a deterrent to speculators depends on a general
confidence that the government would actually permit interest rates to keep rising as long as foreign
exchange reserves are being depleted no matter how much damage those high rates do to the-21- SelfProt.122198
economy.  If a collapse of domestic demand and sharp rise in unemployment would instead induce
the government to bend the rules of the currency board, permitting the central bank to issue bank 
reserves without full foreign currency backing, the automatic confidence factor is gone and the
currency board becomes only a promise of the government not to devalue or to pursue an inflationary
momentary policy.  .  
Whatever its virtue as a signal of the government’s intention to avoid inflation, the currency
board is not a way of preventing currency crises.  Indeed, if the Hong Kong government eventually
succumbs to the current deepening recession in Hong Kong by devaluing the currency and reducing
interest rates, Argentina’s currency board would probably lose credibility and the basic notion of the
currency board would be sent back to the textbooks of monetary history.
Dollar Zone or Yen Zone
One way to avoid currency crises is to abandon the local currency completely and to replace
it with the dollar or yen. This in effect has happened in Europe where the euro has replaced the
national currencies.  Could Mexico adopt the dollar as its national currency or Thailand adopt the
yen?  The short answer is “no.” 
The countries that use the euro will have access to their national central banks as lenders of
last resort.  If commercial banks in Italy or Portugal are in trouble, their central banks will provide
as many euros as the depositors want and a widespread bank run will be averted. Although Mexican
commercial banks are estimated to have bad loans equal to 20 percent of more of GDP, the Mexican
banking system does not collapse because the public knows that the Bank of Mexico can create pesos
to replace the deposits of any bank that fails.  But if  those peso deposits were relabeled as dollar
deposits, there would be no Mexican central bank with the ability  to provide the dollars that-22- SelfProt.122198
depositors demand. The result would be widespread bank runs leading to a currency crisis as
Mexicans sought to take their funds out of the country to the safety of US and other foreign banks.
The only way for Mexico to adopt the dollar as its currency would be to have American banks
provide the Mexican banking services and to cede monetary policy to the Federal Reserve. Even if
the Mexicans were willing to do so, creating a currency union for two such very different economies
would cause serious economic problems for Mexico. 
Conclusion
Large current account deficits, excessive short term foreign currency liabilities, and weak
banking systems increase the likelihood of devastating currency crises, painful fluctuations in
exchange rates, and externally driven swings in domestic interest rates.  Political and business leaders
in emerging market countries rightly ask themselves  what can be done to reduce these risks. There
is no substitute for sound economic policies: moderate trade deficits, low net levels of short-term
foreign debts, and relatively sound banking systems.  But even those countries that pursue such
policies are at risk to the powerful forces of market contagion, shifts in risk aversion, and irrational
speculation. 
Because the IMF and other international organizations do not have the resources to act as
lenders of last resort, the emerging market countries that want to prevent sharp currency declines
must provide for their own protection through increased liquidity.  Reductions in the extent of short
term capital inflows would reduce the risk of balance sheet illiquidity. Much larger amounts of foreign
exchange reserves than countries have traditionally held could be an important source of  -23- SelfProt.122198
protection, flexibility, and confidence. Collateralized credit facilities with private institutions might
provide the rapid access to additional liquidity in place of the missing (and infeasible) official lender
of last resort.  Each of these options is expensive but could prove far less costly than the damage of
currency crises. 
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